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Three Theories of Copyright in
Ratings
James Grimmelmann*
ABSTRACT
Are ratings copyrightable? The answer depends on what ratings
are. As a history of copyright in ratings shows, some courts treat them
as unoriginal facts, some treat them as creative opinions, and some
treat them as troubling self-fulfilling prophecies. The push and pull
among these three theories explains why ratings are such a difficult
boundary case for copyright, both doctrinally and theoretically. The
fact-opinion tension creates a perverse incentive for raters: the less
useful a rating, the more copyrightable it looks. Self-fulfilling ratings
are the most troubling of all: copyright’s usual balance between
incentives and access becomes indeterminate when ratings shape
reality, rather than vice versa. All three theories are necessary for a
complete understanding of ratings.
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Vanderbilt Law School

16th1

Pepolino

26 (food) 19 (decor) 24 (service)2

United States debt

AA+3

Uncharted: 3

924

AAPL

Buy5

Stony Brook University Hospital

☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ (patient survival of
GI bleeds)6

These are all ratings, and our society is awash in them. There
is no question so large or so trivial it cannot be answered by consulting
a rating: Where should I go for lunch? How should a pension fund
invest? Who would win in a fight: Teddy Roosevelt or Lawrence of
Arabia?7 When billions of dollars and the courses of lives can turn on
ratings, it is no surprise that they are big business. Google, Fair
Isaac, Moody’s, U.S. News: these are the houses that ratings built.

1.
Best Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://grad-schools.usnews.rankings
andreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/law-rankings (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
2.
Pepolino, ZAGAT, http://www.zagat.com/r/pepolino-manhattan (last visited Mar. 3,
2012).
3.
NIKOLA G. SWANN, STANDARD & POOR’S, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA LONG-TERM
RATING LOWERED TO ‘AA+’ ON POLITICAL RISKS AND RISING DEBT BURDEN; OUTLOOK NEGATIVE
(Aug. 5, 2011), available at http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/us-rating-action/en/us
(follow article hyperlink).
4.
Uncharted 3: Drake’s Deception, METACRITIC, http://www.metacritic.com/game/
playstation-3/uncharted-3-drakes-deception (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
5.
Apple Inc. (AAPL), YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/ao?s=aapl (last
visited Feb. 29, 2012) (listing “Buy” ratings from numerous analysts).
6.
Stony Brook University Medical Center, HEALTHGRADES, http://www.healthgrades.
com/hospital-directory/new-york-ny-nyc-suburbs-long-island/hospital-awardsHGST7AF97B36
330393 (last visited Feb. 29, 2012) (follow “Gastrointestinal Bleed” hyperlink).
7.
No kidding. Deadliest Warrior: Teddy Roosevelt vs. Lawrence of Arabia (Spike
television broadcast August 24, 2011), available at http://www.spike.com/full-episodes/o6jub7/
deadliest-warrior-teddy-roosevelt-vs-lawrence-of-arabia-season-3-ep-306. For the curious, the
answer is (allegedly) Teddy Roosevelt, thanks to his excellent rating of 86 for “Calm Under Fire.”
Id.
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But if ratings mania is one of the characteristic phenomena of
this status-mad age, then so is ratings anxiety. Scholars pillory the
U.S. News ratings for their effects on legal education—and yet no one
can stop paying attention.8 To speak of the “subprime” mortgage
crisis is to describe it as a crisis caused by loans to people with
particular credit ratings. When those loans were repackaged and sold
as “investment-grade” securities, this, too, was dependent on ratings,
and the credit-rating agencies were sued for their role in the ensuing
meltdown.9 Yelp was sued for allegedly shaking down the businesses
it rates;10 Google’s search-ranking practices are the subject of a
high-profile, high-stakes antitrust investigation.11
This Article starts the process of rationally reconstructing the
law of ratings by asking whether they are copyrightable. The
deceptively simple answer to that question is that they are not, under
the “short phrases” doctrine. This long-standing copyright rule, now
codified in Copyright Office regulations, holds that “[w]ords and short
phrases such as names, titles, and slogans” are per se
uncopyrightable.12 Even though copyright’s threshold of originality is
low, some alleged “works” are still too short to step across it.13 Every
rating discussed in this Article is trivially short; it is hard to think of a
better case for the application of the short phrases doctrine than an
individual rating.
Thus, ratings are copyrightable, if at all, only in bulk—that is,
as compilations. A compilation consists of materials “that are
selected, coordinated, or arranged” to evince originality.14 Under
ordinary principles of compilation analysis, courts will need to filter
out “commonplace,” “expected,” or “inevitable” arrangements and
ratings as unoriginal.15 They will also need to apply the merger
doctrine16 to consider the “range of possible expressions” for the rating

8.
See, e.g., Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Interplay Between Law School Rankings,
Reputations, and Resource Allocation: Ways Rankings Mislead, 81 IND. L.J. 229 (2006).
9.
See, e.g., Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor’s Fin. Servs., LLC,
813 F. Supp. 2d 871 (S.D. Ohio 2011).
10.
See Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., Nos. C-10-1321 EMC & C-10-2351 EMC, 2011 WL 5079526
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011) (granting motion to dismiss).
11.
See Claire Cain Miller, Google’s New Search Results Raise Privacy and Antitrust
Concerns, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Jan. 12, 2012), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/12/
googles-new-search-results-raise-privacy-and-antitrust-concerns.
12.
37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2012).
13.
See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 4:2 (describing short phrases
rule as application of de minimis principles).
14.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
15.
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363-64 (1991).
16.
Merger is a corollary of the basic copyright doctrine that ideas are not copyrightable.
“[E]ven expression is not protected in those instances where there is only one or so few ways of
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given the predictions it tries to make.17 These phrases conceal
enormous practical difficulties, which courts and scholars have
resolved only by importing ontological beliefs about what ratings are
and normative beliefs about what ratings are for. That they have
been unable to agree on how to do so is a sign of how contested those
beliefs are—just like ratings themselves.
Courts have developed not one theory of ratings, but three, and
all three are necessary to understand how ratings work. Sometimes
the law treats ratings as statements of fact, which are either true or
false. Sometimes it treats them as creative opinions, which exist
independently of the world. And sometimes it treats them as
self-fulfilling prophecies, which remake the world in their own image.
Each explains something important about ratings, but each view is
incomplete on its own.
Paying close attention to these three theories has a paradoxical
pair of payoffs for copyright. On the one hand, doing so clarifies
copyright’s doctrinal treatment of ratings. It becomes possible to see
the ratings copyright cases not as an inconsistent mess, but rather as
partial explanations of a complex phenomenon. Ratings are built up
from layers of facts, opinions, and prophecies; closer attention to their
interplay can help courts make better decisions in ratings cases.18
On the other hand, close attention to these three theories of
ratings raises unsettling questions about copyright’s theoretical
framework. The conventional utilitarian story of copyright’s tradeoff
between incentives and access runs into serious trouble with ratings’
predictive component.
Treating highly factual ratings as
uncopyrightable and highly opinionated ones as copyrightable gets the
incentive exactly backwards at the border: the more arbitrary (and
hence less accurate) a rating is, the more willing copyright will be to
protect it.
Adding self-fulfilling prophecies to the mix is like adding
saltpeter to sulfur and charcoal: the combination is explosive. Instead
of resolving the fact-opinion tension, thinking of ratings as prophecies
blows up copyright’s theoretical framework. Courts have questioned
whether the production of self-fulfilling ratings requires intellectual
expressing an idea that protection of the expression would effectively accord protection to the
idea itself.” Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991).
17.
NYMEX, Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 109, 117 (2d Cir. 2007).
18.
This analysis may translate to other types of works with features similar to ratings,
such as taxonomies. See, e.g., ADA v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997)
(finding copyright in a taxonomy of dental billing codes, which—like ratings—are a numerical
way of organizing the world). For a fuller discussion of the similarities between taxonomies and
ratings, and the problems taxonomies pose for copyright law, see generally Justin Hughes, Size
Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 575 (2005).
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property incentives, but this judicial skepticism also calls into
question the argument for public access to those ratings. Utilitarian
copyright theory becomes wholly ambiguous when applied to ratings.
Part I recounts the history of ratings copyright. Part II uses
this history to bring out the three theories of ratings—as facts,
opinions, and self-fulfilling prophecies—and shows how those theories
intertwine in explaining how ratings work. Part III returns to
copyright, asking what a richer understanding of ratings has to say
about ratings doctrine and utilitarian copyright theory. Part IV
examines what others have had to say about some of the ratings cases,
showing how the three theories influence their arguments. Part V
reflects on the larger lessons the three theories may hold for
informational law beyond copyright.
Before beginning in earnest, it will be helpful to fix a few basic
concepts about ratings. A rating is an attempt to quantify quality.19
It takes a complex and messy reality and maps it onto a single clear
axis of quality. The possible scales, of course, are as varied as human
imagination. Metacritic rates movies, music, TV shows, video games,
and more from 1 to 100;20 Moody’s rates long-term bonds from C to
Aaa;21 the U.S. Department of Agriculture grades beef from Cull to
Prime.22 A ranking is a special case of a rating in which the scale is
ordinal: first best, second best, and so on through worst.
Ratings are a kind of communication. They are messages
uttered by a rater using a specified code to convey something about
the rating’s subject to users who act on the ratings. Even a private
rating is still communicative. The hermetic wine connoisseur who
keeps a notebook of her impressions is sending her future self a
message about what to drink and what not to.
Ratings also necessarily have a systemic character. A rating by
itself is uninteresting. What is interesting is how the subject stacks
up against its peers. Not all children can be above average; a rating
system that gives every movie five stars is worthless. Typically, this
systemic character is expressed in the evaluative process that leads to
the rating. The choices made in designing and applying the process

19.
See, e.g., Rating, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com (follow “Quick
Search” hyperlink;; then search “Rating”;; then follow “rating, n. 1” hyperlink) (last modified Mar.
2012) (defining “rating” as “[a]n assessment (esp. according to an established scale) of the value,
performance, or contents of something offered commercially”).
20.
See How We Create the Metascore Magic, METACRITIC, http://www.metacritic.com/
about-metascores (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
21.
See MOODY’S, MOODY’S RATING SYMBOLS & DEFINITIONS 8 (June 2009), available at
http://www.moodys.com/sites/products/AboutMoodysRatingsAttachments/MoodysRatingsSymbol
sand%20Definitions.pdf.
22.
7 C.F.R. § 54.17(b) (2012).

856

VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 14:4:851

are what differentiate one subject’s rating from another’s, and one
rater’s ratings from another’s.
Why are ratings worthwhile? The short answer is that they
make markets work better by helping buyers sort the wheat from the
chaff.23 Take the rating that the Zagat Restaurant Guide gave to
Pepolino’s food in its most recent annual survey: 26. That’s a pretty
good rating; it puts Pepolino in the top 1 percent of New York City
restaurants.24 A diner who uses a Zagat guide and eats at Pepolino
will be happier than one who didn’t know the restaurant existed or
didn’t know it was good. This improved matching, in turn, creates
better incentives for the future. When Zagat’s readers eat at Pepolino,
its chefs, staff, and owners reap the rewards of their good work over
the past year. During the year to come, they’ll have an incentive to
keep it up, lest their rating slip and Zagat-armed diners go elsewhere.
Good ratings take a market for lemons and make lemonade.25
I. A HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN RATINGS
The story of copyright in ratings follows a simple arc. A
hundred years ago, courts routinely extended copyright to ratings
based on the effort expended in producing them; courts were happy to
assume that the ratings themselves were unoriginal facts.26 The
modern rejection of “sweat of the brow” labor-based copyright kicked
the doctrinal legs out from under this approach, leading some courts
to respond either by denying copyright entirely, or by treating ratings
as unoriginal facts embedded in a creatively arranged compilation.27
In a series of cases involving price guides, the U.S. Courts of Appeals
for the Second and Ninth Circuits gradually transmuted this
compilation theory of factual ratings into a theory that treated the
ratings themselves as original—and hence copyrightable—opinions by
focusing on the creative choices made in the process that generated

23.
These “markets” don’t have to be monetary. If a travel guide puts Central Park on
its top-ten list of must-see New York destinations for tourists, the only thing the tourists have to
spend is their time. So it might be more precise to say that ratings help people facing matching
problems make better choices. That said, market discourse is a useful way of summarizing key
ratings properties concisely.
24.
Restaurant Inspection Information, N.Y. CITY DEP’T HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/rii/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (stating that there
are 24,000 restaurants in New York City).
25.
This explanation is problematic, for reasons to be made clear shortly. But it is not
possible to understand the complexities of ratings without an idea of what raters are trying to
accomplish with them.
26.
See infra Part I.A.
27.
See infra Part I.B.
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the ratings.28 In the last few years, courts have started to express
serious anxiety about certain ratings based on the sense that they
may be facts after all—facts created by the rater.29
A. Credit Reports and “Sweat of the Brow” Copyright
The first round of copyright litigation over ratings concerned
credit-report books30: volumes of “the names of businessmen,
organized by city, with an identification of the type of business and a
numerical or letter code estimating the worth and credit standing of
each entry.”31 For example, the book at issue in one case, the Marble
and Granite Exchange Mercantile Agency’s Blue Book, rated
businesses’ net worth on a scale of AA (for $1,000,000 and above) to P
(for $1 to $600) and their credit performance from 1 for “First-Class
Pay” to 5 for “Investigate Pay.”32
These cases are notable for what they say about the ratings
themselves: absolutely nothing. Today, courts might be inclined to
distinguish between what are indisputably facts, such as businesses’
names and addresses, and the credit ratings, which are far more
ambiguously so. But the early courts were utterly uninterested by any
such distinction; they uniformly and without comment treated the
ratings as though they were also facts. In 1908, the U.S. Supreme
Court, in Dun v. Lumbermen’s Credit Association, referred to the
“rating and other facts contained in defendants’ book.”33 And in 1924,
a district court likewise assumed that copyright should treat names
and ratings more or less identically—each must be the product of the
defendant’s “[h]onest, thorough, efficient verification, by personal
search,” or else it will infringe.34
Why this unconcern? It did not matter whether ratings were
facts. The work invested by the rater in producing a collection—its
“sweat of the brow” as later courts would later call it35—was a
sufficient basis for copyright against a defendant who did not make its
own independent efforts. Nothing set a book of credit ratings apart

28.
See infra Part I.C.
29.
See infra Part I.D.
30.
See generally James H. Madison, The Evolution of Commercial Credit Reporting
Agencies in Nineteenth-Century America, 48 BUS. HIST. REV. 164, 167 (1974) (discussing business
and legal history of credit reporting in the nineteenth century and the turn to publication).
31.
Id. at 173.
32.
Ladd v. Oxnard, 75 F. 703, 706 (D. Mass. 1896).
33.
Dun v. Lumbermen’s Credit Ass’n, 209 U.S. 20, 21 (1908).
34.
Produce Reporter Co. v. Fruit Produce Rating Agency, 1 F.2d 58, 61 (N.D. Ill. 1924);
see also Cravens v. Retail Credit Men’s Ass’n, 26 F.2d 833, 834 (M.D. Tenn. 1924).
35.
E.g., Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 131 (1985).
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from a book of obviously factual information; a finding that the ratings
were or were not facts would leave the outcome unchanged. Thus,
courts could treat them as facts without concern.
Indeed, the statements of law in the credit-rating cases are all
but indistinguishable from the statements in other directory cases.
Here is the “classic formulation”36 of the sweat of the brow doctrine, as
seen in a 1922 dispute over a directory of names and addresses: “No
one can legally take the results of the labor and expense which
another has incurred in the publishing of his work, and thereby save
himself ‘the expense and labor of working out and arriving at those
results by some independent road.’”37
Two years later, the court in a ratings case, Produce Reporter
Company v. Fruit Produce Rating Agency, explained:
If one uses another’s compilation directly, without any verification, he is, of course,
guilty of the pure, unadulterated, labor-saving device of copying. . . . [I]f the rating as
finally made is based upon what is copied, rather than upon what is discovered by
verification, . . . there has been an infringement.38

There was no daylight between these two explanations. Ratings were
facts.
B. Feist and Compilation Copyright
With the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, sweat of the brow
was not long for this world.39 By providing copyright only for “original
works of authorship,”40 the Act excluded the unoriginal fruits of
substantial labor. The Supreme Court’s decision in Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. cemented this rule.41 Originality,
the Court explained, is the “touchstone of copyright protection,”42 and
“copyright rewards originality, not effort.”43 Indeed, it was “the most
fundamental axiom of copyright law” that facts were
uncopyrightable.44

36.
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352 (1991).
37.
Jeweler’s Circular Pub’g Co. v. Keystone Pub’g Co., 281 F. 83, 95 (2d Cir. 1922)
(quoting Morris v. Ashbee, [1868] L.R. 7 Eq. 34).
38.
Produce Reporter Co., 1 F.2d at 61.
39.
The last gasp of sweat-of-the-brow in a ratings case was National Business Lists,
Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89, 90-91 (N.D. Ill. 1982). The court held that
copyright protected not just the “form of expression” but also the “fruits of the compiler’s
industry.” Id. at 92.
40.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
41.
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 340.
42.
Id. at 347.
43.
Id. at 364.
44.
Id. at 344-45.
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How far does this doctrinal logic extend to ratings? In the
1980s, courts denied copyright protection to the raw data on which
ratings were based45 and to the “research” required to discover facts.46
One leading case, Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, held that a
historian’s theory about the cause of the Hindenburg explosion was an
uncopyrightable “interpretation” of facts.47 Taken to its logical limit,
this line of reasoning would hold that a rating, as an interpretation of
the facts about its subject, is per se uncopyrightable, no matter how
creative, complex, or difficult the research used to obtain it.
Indeed, some cases explicitly treat ratings as facts. In RBC
Nice Bearings, Inc. v. Peer Bearing Co., the U.S. District Court for the
District of Connecticut held that load ratings for ball bearings—the
weight they could be expected to support—were uncopyrightable
facts.48 The court’s merger analysis is especially revealing. It held
that the plaintiff failed to show that the “range of possible variations”
for the load ratings was broad enough to leave room for reasonable
raters to disagree.49 That is black letter merger doctrine, but it also
assumes that a ball bearing’s load rating is a fact fully determined by
the metallurgical properties of steel. To similar effect is Lowry’s
Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., where the parties agreed that three
numbers in the plaintiff’s daily stock market reports—“buying power,”
“selling pressure,” and “short term buying power”—were
uncopyrightable facts.50 It mattered not that the numbers were the
“crown jewels” of the reports and that the plaintiff computed them
using a confidential algorithm.51
Ratings as facts were not
copyrightable.
Treating ratings as facts was, however, compatible with a more
limited version of copyright: compilation copyright. The Copyright Act
and Feist made it clear that a compilation, even one consisting of facts,
could be copyrighted if it displayed “original selection or
45.
See Fin. Info. v. Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding
that large collections of notecards with data on municipal bond redemptions were
uncopyrightable, notwithstanding the extensive effort required to produce them).
46.
Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1372 (5th Cir. 1981) (“The
valuable distinction in copyright law between facts and the expression of facts cannot be
maintained if research is held to be copyrightable.”).
47.
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978 (2d Cir. 1980)
(“[I]nterpretations are not copyrightable as a matter of law.”);; see also Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899
F.2d 1537 (7th Cir. 1990); Randal C. Picker, Essay, Easterbrook on Copyright, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
1165 (2010) (discussing Nash).
48.
RBC Nice Bearings, Inc. v. Peer Bearing Co., 676 F. Supp. 2d 9, 22 (D. Conn. 2009).
49.
Id. at 23; accord NYMEX, Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 109,
117-18 (2d Cir. 2007).
50.
Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 737, 742 (D. Md. 2003).
51.
Id. (nature of reports and numbers); id. at 754 (agreement that numbers were
uncopyrightable).
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arrangement.”52 Plaintiffs and courts learned to redo their analyses in
terms of the creative aspects of a compilation’s selection and
arrangement of ratings. Thus, in Eckes v. Card Prices Update, the
plaintiffs and the defendant both published baseball card price
guides.53 The plaintiffs’ guide contained about 18,000 baseball card
values, about 5,000 of which also bore a star designating the cards as
“premium.”54 The Second Circuit avoided the question of whether the
values were uncopyrightable facts; instead, it held that the list of
premium cards was copyrightable as a compilation.55
C. Opinions and Creative Processes
Eckes also opened the door for courts to start treating ratings
as something more than just facts about the world. The card prices
were not the only ratings at stake in the case: whether a card is
starred (premium) or unstarred (common) is itself a rating.56 Thus,
the plaintiff’s “selection” of cards for the premium list was wholly
determined by the star rating.57 The holding that the list was
copyrightable therefore implied that the 18,000 ratings themselves
must contain some form of copyrightable originality. Eckes itself did
not inquire further, stating only that “baseball fans would argue
about” which players were most important, and that any such choice
was “necessarily subjectively based.”58

52.
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991);; see also 17
U.S.C. §§ 101 (2006) (defining “compilation”), 103(b) (defining scope of copyright in compilations).
53.
Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984). A “price” in the sense of
what someone asks you to pay, or in the sense of what someone paid in the past, is not, strictly
speaking, a rating. But a “price” in the sense of an estimate of what something is worth is a
rating; it is a rating whose scale is denominated in dollars. The full story of copyright in prices
and price estimates has yet to be told. An important and illuminating start is J. Harold Mulherin
et al., Prices Are Property: The Organization of Financial Exchanges from a Transaction Cost
Perspective, 34 J.L. & ECON. 591 (1991).
54.
Eckes, 736 F.2d at 860.
55.
Id. at 863 (“[The plaintiffs] exercised selection, creativity and judgment in
choosing . . . which were the 5,000 premium cards.”).
56.
See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
57.
See Eckes, 736 F.2d at 860-63. More generally, the “selection” in any compilation can
always be understood in terms of an implicit rating on a scale with two values: “worthy of
inclusion” and “not worthy of inclusion.” Cf. Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters,
Inc., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that a directory of businesses of interest to
Chinese-Americans displayed originality in selection).
58.
Eckes, 736 F.2d at 863. Notably, when discussing proof of copying, the court cited
the “inadvertent[]” absence of the 1963 Topps Bill Virdon rookie card from both premium lists.
Id. at 864. As the court explained, “some baseball cards would appear as premium on any
baseball card collector’s list,” and “[i]t appears undisputed that the Virdon card would qualify as
premium.” Id. at 863, 864. Thus, as Eckes recognized, the process is subjective, but not wholly so.
See infra Part II.B.
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The Second Circuit took this idea and ran with it in CCC
Information Services v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc.59
Maclean Hunter publishes the Red Book, a used-car price guide.60 It
gives predicted estimates of prices for used cars based on model, age,
mileage, condition, geographic location, and other factors.61 CCC
created a computerized service for users to look up Red Book values.62
The Second Circuit held for Maclean Hunter, finding originality in the
Red Book’s taxonomic choices: its geographical distinctions, use of
5,000-mile increments, inclusion of particular features, and so on.63
This part of the opinion is compatible with a belief that the values
themselves were uncopyrightable facts arranged in a copyrightable
compilation.
But Maclean Hunter also went further: it held that the Red
Book’s values were copyrightable opinions.64 As best-guess estimates,
they were “neither reports of historical prices nor mechanical
derivations.”65 In a significant turn, the court focused on the process
used to come up with the prices: they were based “not only on a
multitude of data sources, but also on professional judgment and
expertise,” involving the weighing of “fifteen considerations.”66 The
Red Book’s prices were original because they were the outputs of a
creative process.
This move set up an immediate problem for the court: why
weren’t the prices uncopyrightable as “interpretations” of factual
data?67 The court addressed this question under the heading of
merger, asking whether Maclean Hunter’s specific prices merged into
the idea of pricing particular cars. Here, the court deployed a
distinction between “building-block” ideas that “undertake to advance
the understanding of phenomena” and “soft” ideas that are “infused
with the author’s taste or opinion.”68 It held that the Red Book’s
prices were the latter, because they were “approximative,” they
“explain[ed] nothing, and describe[d] no method, process or

59.
CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir.
1994).
60.
Id. at 63.
61.
Id. at 63-64.
62.
Id. at 64.
63.
Id. at 67. Here, the selection and arrangement did not really involve ratings, except
perhaps negatively, in the claim that any features not included were not likely to significantly
affect a car’s value. See id.
64.
Id. at 72-73.
65.
Id. at 67.
66.
Id.
67.
Cf. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980).
68.
Maclean Hunter, 44 F.3d at 71-72.
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procedure,” and left final valuation up to the reader.69 This language
marked a definitive turn from ratings-as-facts to ratings-as-opinions.
The Ninth Circuit then found that ratings qua ratings were
copyrightable as opinions in a case involving competing price guides,
CDN Inc. v. Kapes.70 Unlike in Eckes and Maclean Hunter, the
plaintiff did not allege that the defendant had copied its selection and
arrangement, only the prices, so the outcome turned on whether the
prices themselves were copyrightable.71 The court found that they
were copyrightable by focusing on the process CDN followed to
generate them.72 As it explained:
What is important is the fact that both Maclean and CDN arrive at the prices they list
through a process that involves using their judgment to distill and extrapolate from
factual data. It is simply not a process through which they discover a preexisting
historical fact, but rather a process by which they create a price which, in their best
judgment, represents the value of an item as closely as possible. . . . This process
imbues the prices listed with sufficient creativity and originality to make them
copyrightable.73

On Kapes’s theory, ratings are “creative” in two senses. First, they are
the results of creativity: raters make an independent judgment using
subjectivity and expertise. Second, they are acts of creation: raters
make something that has not existed before.
Courts following this approach ask about the choices made by
the rater in deciding which data to look at, how to weight it, which
algorithms to use, when to override the algorithm, and to what extent
those choices are dictated by industry standards or market realities.74
Where the courts find “professional judgment” and “creativity” in a
rating, they will treat it as a copyrightable opinion, even against a
plaintiff who would prefer that it be treated as a fact so as to avoid
copyright preemption.75
The apotheosis of this approach is the US District Court for the
District of Colorado’s opinion in Health Grades, Inc. v. Robert Wood
69.
Id. at 72-73.
70.
CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1999).
71.
Id. at 1259 (“Rather, the issue in this case is whether the prices themselves are
sufficiently original as compilations to sustain a copyright.”). Doctrinally and taxonomically, the
court is confused: the prices may be original, and they may be elements of a compilation, but
they are not themselves compilations, which are defined as the “collection and assembling of
preexisting materials.” See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). A rating may be derived from other materials,
but unlike a compilation, it is not composed of them. The important part of Kapes’s holding is the
clear statement that prices can be original. Kapes, 197 F.3d at 1259.
72.
Kapes, 197 F.3d at 1260.
73.
Id. at 1261 (emphasis added).
74.
See NYMEX, Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007);
BanxCorp v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); cf. Mulherin, supra
note 53.
75.
Agora Fin., LLC v. Samler, 725 F. Supp. 2d 491, 503 (D. Md. 2010).
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Johnson University Hospital, Inc.76 Health Grades rates doctors and
hospitals; it uses secret statistical techniques to assign them one,
three, or five stars, and to create various “best of” lists.77 Robert Wood
Johnson (RWJ), a hospital in New Jersey, started issuing press
releases touting its ratings.78 Health Grades sued.79 The court held
that Health Grades’ ratings were the “product of a creative and
original process that is informed by Health Grades’ judgment and
choices.”80 RWJ had argued that the idea and the expression in the
ratings had merged, and also that ratings like “☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ” were
uncopyrightable “short phrases.”81
The court, however, was
unpersuaded.82 It wrote: “Health Grades has not, however, asserted
copyright infringement based on RWJ’s copying of only these short
titles or phrases, but rather on its copying of five star ratings and
clinical excellence designations specifically attributed to Health
Grades that are the product of Health Grades’ rating and award
system.”83
Thus, according to Health Grades, a sufficiently creative
process yields copyrightable ratings.84

76.
See Health Grades, Inc. v. Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d
1226 (D. Colo. 2009).
77.
Id. at 1234.
78.
Id. at 1231.
79.
Id. at 1230. The case is also notable because RWJ was not a competing rater, but
rather, the rated party itself. See id. Suits against the rated party are rare, but they do happen.
It is a natural consequence of any business model in which individual clients pay for access to
the ratings and each rated party deals with a large number of clients. In these cases, highly
rated parties will want to trumpet their good ratings, but the rater cannot afford to allow this
process to unwind too far, or clients will be able to learn all they need to without paying. See,
e.g., Consumers Union v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983) (denying preliminary
injunction against quoting from positive Consumer Reports review);; Angie’s List, Inc. v.
Ameritech Publ’g, Inc., No. 1:07-cv-1630-SEB-JMS, 2010 WL 2521722 (S.D. Ind. June 15, 2010)
(denying motion to dismiss trademark infringement claims by Angie’s List against publisher of
telephone directory containing advertisements by businesses touting their “Super Service
Award” ratings).
80.
Health Grades, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 1235. Following CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d
1256 (9th Cir. 1999), the court further confused matters by referring to the ratings as “original
factual compilations protected by copyright.” Health Grades, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 1235. Once
again, the holding that a rating is itself a compilation is like nails on a chalkboard for a copyright
scholar. See PATRY, supra note 13, § 4:50 (calling Health Grades “[i]nstructive, although not for
its result”).
81.
Health Grades, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 1237.
82.
See id. at 1237-38.
83.
Id.
84.
See id. at 1235 (noting that an original process “imbues the prices listed with
sufficient creativity and originality to make them copyrightable” (quoting Kapes, 197 F.3d at
1261)).
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D. Judicial Skepticism
Even as courts have grown increasingly expansive in finding
that ratings are original creations, they have also grown increasingly
uncomfortable with ratings’ creative potential. They have become
concerned that perhaps ratings are facts after all—not facts that
preexisted the rater, but rather facts that the rater imposes upon the
world.
There are hints of this idea in Eckes and Maclean Hunter.85
The district court in Eckes suggested that “since the plaintiffs’ work is
regarded as the authority in the field, it is entirely possible that the
prices in their publication not only reflect market prices, but in fact
can determine market prices.”86 Thus, some similarities might reflect
the plaintiffs’ influence, rather than prove copying.87 In Maclean
Hunter, the plaintiff’s values allegedly became facts in a more explicit
way: several states required use of Red Book values in computing
insurance payments.88 In those states, it didn’t matter what auto
dealers and consumers were paying for used cars; if the Red Book and
another guide each said that the price of Delia’s wrecked Corolla was
$500, the insurance company would need to cut her check for at least
that much.89 This argument led the district court to hold that the
prices had entered the public domain.90 The Second Circuit disagreed
and held that incorporation into public law is not enough, without
more, to strip a work of copyright.91
Some more recent cases have also wrestled with the idea that a
sufficiently authoritative price estimate can, for all intents and
purposes, become the price. The court in BanxCorp v. Costco
Wholesale Corp. explained that “the more acceptance a financial
85.
See infra text accompanying notes 86-91.86. Eckes v. Suffolk Collectables & C.P.U.,
575 F. Supp. 459, 464 (E.D.N.Y 1983), rev’d sub nom. Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859,
864 (2d Cir. 1984).
86.
Eckes v. Suffolk Collectables & C.P.U., 575 F. Supp. 459, 464 (E.D.N.Y 1983), rev’d
sub nom. Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 864 (2d Cir. 1984).
87.
Id. On appeal, the Second Circuit did not consider the legal implications of this
possibility because it held that it was unproven as a factual matter whether the guide really had
such influence. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d at 864.
88.
CCC Info. Servs. Inc., v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 64 (2d Cir.
1994).
89.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-353(a) (2011) (mandating minimum value of
average of two approved guides).
90.
Maclean Hunter, 44 F.3d at 64.
91.
Id. at 73-74. On the issue of the copyright in works incorporated into law, see, e.g.,
Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc. 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc);; Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking and the Case of
Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291 (2005); Pamela Samuelson, Questioning Copyrights in
Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 193 (2007).
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measure obtains (i.e. the more successful it is), the more ‘fact-like’ it
becomes.”92
And in New York Mercantile Exchange v.
IntercontinentalExchange, the plaintiff required commodities traders
to post margin according to the prices it promulgated.93 Even if its
prices were “wrong” in some abstract Platonic sense, traders needed to
value their open positions accordingly.94 The Second Circuit held that
under these circumstances, the plaintiff did not need copyright’s
incentives to create its prices.95
The most stunning example of judicial skepticism of ratings is
the Second Circuit’s recent opinion in Barclays Capital Inc. v.
Theflyonthewall.com.96 The plaintiffs were investment brokers who
provided favored clients with detailed stock reports sometimes
running to hundreds of pages.97 Some of these reports contained
ratings for particular stocks (e.g., a 1, 2, or 3 to indicate whether stock
was expected to beat, match, or fall short of comparable stocks over
the next year).98 And some of these reports were “actionable”—for
example, downgrading a stock’s rating—in that they were likely to
lead a client to change its stock holdings immediately.99
Theflyonthewall.com (Fly) posted the actionable ratings to its website
and various subscription services.100 The brokers sued for hot news
misappropriation.101
The district court found misappropriation,102 but the Second
Circuit reversed in an opinion that also casts grave doubt on copyright
protection of influential ratings.103 In the majority’s view, Fly was
“collecting, collating and disseminating factual information—the facts
that Firms and others in the securities business have made
92.
BanxCorp v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 596, 605 n.7 (S.D.N.Y 2010).
93.
NYMEX, Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 109, 110-12 (2d Cir. 2007).
94.
Id. at 115.
95.
Id. at 118.
96.
Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011).
97.
Id. at 880-81.
98.
See Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 316 n.5
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
99.
Id. at 316.
100.
Id. at 323-25.
101.
Id. at 313. They also brought claims of copyright infringement for verbatim copying
of a handful of reports. Id. at 327. Fly claimed fair use, but eventually conceded infringement,
costing it $12,750 in statutory damages (the statutory minimum), id. at 329, and $200,000 in
attorneys’ fees (for needlessly contesting infringement). See Barclays Capital Inc. v.
Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 4908(DLC), 2010 WL 2640095 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 30,
2010). It appears that these were instances of sloppiness, rather than core components of Fly’s
business model.
102.
Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 345-47.
103.
See Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876, 877 (2d Cir.
2011).
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recommendations.”104 And the majority was quite clear that these
were not “facts” in the usual Feist-ian sense. Instead, the facts were
“something [the Firms] create using their expertise and experience
rather than acquire through efforts akin to reporting.”105 The majority
repeatedly emphasized Fly’s bona fides as a news medium, writing,
“[t]he Firms are making the news; Fly . . . is breaking it,”106 and
compared Fly’s activities to a newspaper reporting on political
endorsements by other newspapers.107 Judge Raggi’s, concurring
opinion called the ratings “uncopyrightable opinions” and cited
Hoehling v. Universal Pictures, the case that held “interpretations” of
fact uncopyrightable.108
The majority’s view of why the ratings were facts is partially
rooted in a pair of remarkable footnotes in a section of its opinion
labeled “Moral Dimensions.”109 Footnote twenty-eight pointed out,
with support in the record: “It may nonetheless be worth noting the
peculiar nature of the Recommendations insofar as they tend to be
self-fulfilling prophecies. Irrespective of the quality of a particular
report and Recommendation, the Recommendation alone is likely to
move the market price of a security in the short term.”110
Footnote twenty-nine then brought out the implications of this
111
point.
If the “bare fact” of a rating’s promulgation could move a
stock,112 then in part, that was what the brokers’ clients were paying
for: advance notice of market-moving interventions. But if so, the
implications were disturbing.
If construed broadly, the “hot news” misappropriation tort . . . would ensure that the
authorized recipients of the Recommendations would in significant part be profiting
because of their knowledge of the fact of a market-moving Recommendation before other
traders learn of that fact. In that circumstance, the authorized recipient upon whose
commissions the Firms depend to pay for their research activities would literally be
profiting at the expense of persons from whom such knowledge has been withheld who
also trade in the shares in question ignorant of the Recommendation.113

104.
Id. at 902 (emphasis added).
105.
Id. at 903.
106.
Id. at 902.
107.
Id. at 904 n.38.
108.
Id. at 907 (Raggi, J., concurring) (citing Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
618 F.2d 972, 978 (2d Cir. 1980)).
109.
Id. at 894-96 (majority opinion).
110.
Id. at 896 n.28. This assertion had support in the record. See id. (citing Barclays
Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (discussing
short-term market-moving effect of a 2006 Merrill Lynch recommendation to buy General Motors
stock)).
111.
Id. at 896 n.29.
112.
Id.113. Id.
113.
Id.
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Although the majority explained that these observations did not
“affect[] [their] analysis,” they nonetheless explained that the brokers
were asking them to “use state tort law and judicial injunction to
enable one class of traders to profit at the expense of another class
based on their court-enforced unequal access to knowledge of a fact.”114
This view comes close to a condemnation of the brokers’ business
model for their ratings. It also comes close to a condemnation of
ratings themselves.
II. WHAT ARE RATINGS?
As this history of ratings shows, courts don’t have a single clear
theory of whether ratings are copyrightable, because they don’t have a
single clear theory of what ratings are. The cases move among three
distinct and incompatible theories of ratings: that they are facts,
opinions, or self-fulfilling prophecies. This Part introduces the three
theories, shows just how profoundly they differ, and then explains why
all three of them are necessary to understand ratings.
A. Three Theories
The first theory of ratings is that they aspire to be facts. Some
doctors are safer than their peers (☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ); some restaurants’
kitchens are cleaner (A). Some movies are worth seeing (thumbs up);
others are not. Some consumers and countries pay their bills on time
(810 or AAA), others pay late, and still others not at all. If you have a
2003 Upper Deck Derek Jeter card, you should expect to get about $6
for it, not $60.
The factual theory is the most straightforward. It drives the
old credit-rating cases like Lumbermen’s Credit and Produce Reporter
Co., which treat a business’s creditworthiness much like they treat its
total assets or its address, and which locate any copyright in the
rater’s sweat of the brow.115 Under modern doctrine, facts are
categorically excluded from copyright, which explains cases like RBC
Nice Bearings and Legg Mason.116 The factual theory goes a long way
in explaining the influence of compilation reasoning in more recent
cases—it searches for originality in the choice of subjects and the
ordering of ratings, rather than in the ratings themselves.
114.
Id.
115.
See supra Part I.A; see also Dun v. Lumberman’s Credit Ass’n, 209 U.S. 20 (1908);;
Produce Reporter Co. v. Fruit Produce Rating Co., 1 F.2d 58 (N.D. Ill. 1924).
116.
See supra Part I.B; see also RBC Nice Bearings, Inc. v. Peer Bearing Co., 676 F.
Supp. 2d 9 (D. Conn. 2009);; Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 737 (D.
Md. 2003).
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The second theory is that ratings are opinions. This author
gave Street Fight five stars out of five on Netflix.
But user
“thepraetorians” gave it one star out of ten on IMDB, calling it “[t]oo
one-sided.”117 De gustibus non est disputandum. On this view, rating
is inherently subjective, and a good rating is something like a Pauline
Kael film review: a rich, opinionated, and complicated expression of a
well-informed observer.118
This is the most common modern theory of ratings. If they are
creative opinions, then the Bleistein nondiscrimination principle
implies that they are copyrightable on the same terms as any other
creative expression.119 Maclean Hunter was the first case to embrace
this theory fully; Kapes the first to rely solely on it.120 This theory
frequently locates the relevant creativity in the design of the ratings
process; Health Grades shows that the logic of this reasoning makes
ratings copyrightable as soon as they cross the de minimis threshold,
rather than being copyrightable only as part of an original
compilation.121
The third theory is that ratings are self-fulfilling prophecies. A
credit downgrade makes a country less able to pay its bills. The
students whose LSAT scores shape a law school’s U.S. News ranking
themselves choose which school to attend on the basis of its ranking.
A new price target from an analyst will move a stock because everyone
expects everyone else to react to the recommendation, and everyone
expects everyone else to expect to react, and so on ad infinitum—even
if no one actually reacts to the substance of the recommendation itself.
This is the animating theory of Theflyonthewall.com, which
uses the phrase “self-fulfilling prophecies” in explaining why the
analysts’ ratings were “news.”122 It also helps drive the result in
BanxCorp and NYMEX, for similar reasons.123 Although Eckes and
117.
thepraetorians, Comment to Reviews & Ratings for Street Fight, IMDB, (July 23,
2005), http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0457496/reviews?start=10.
118.
See generally BRIAN KELLOW, PAULINE KAEL: A LIFE IN THE DARK (2012) (discussing
Kael’s life and reviews).
119.
See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903) (“It
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only in the law to constitute themselves
final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious
limits.”). See generally Keith Aoki, Contradiction and Context in American Copyright Law, 9
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 303 (1991) (discussing influence of Bleistein).
120.
See supra Part I.C.
121.
See supra Part I.C.
122.
Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876, 896 n.28 (2d Cir.
2011).
123.
See NYMEX, Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 109, 118 (2d Cir.
2007) (stating that the plaintiff’s “exchange requires settlement prices to clear contracts”);;
BanxCorp v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 596, 603 (S.D.N.Y 2010) (considering
“degree of consensus” about prices).
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Maclean Hunter found price guides copyrightable, they took seriously
the allegations that the copyright owner’s valuations were so
authoritative as to call their copyrightability into question.124 These
cases share an intuition that self-fulfilling ratings aren’t the sort of
thing intellectual property law should protect.
Let us compare the theories. If ratings are facts, then they are
discovered; the rater’s job is to investigate the world to learn the true
facts about the subject.125 If ratings are opinions, then they are
created; the rater’s job is to produce a personal evaluation of the
subject.
If ratings are self-fulfilling prophecies, then they are
imposed; the rater’s job is to provide a vision so compelling it will be
universally accepted. The telos of a rating-as-fact is truth; the telos of
a rating-as-opinion is authenticity; the telos of a rating-as-prophecy is
power.
The theories also make radically different claims about
whether ratings can be “true” or “false.”
Treating ratings as
statements of fact immediately implies that they can. To say that a
ball bearing has a load rating of one hundred pounds is to make a
statement that is false if the bearing gives way under a load of fifty
pounds. If ratings are opinions, then they cannot be true or false.
Some people love splatter horror films, others don’t. Even if the
movie-going public disagrees, that doesn’t make a critic’s C-minus
review of Chainsaw Stockbrokers wrong. And to ask whether a
prophetic rating is “true” is beside the point—whatever reality
allegedly preexisted the rating becomes irrelevant once the rating
displaces it. We have arrived back where we started, but the causal
arrow between reality and rating is reversed.126

124.
See supra Part I.
125.
Saying that ratings are “facts” in this sense, of course, does not mean that this is an
accurate philosophical account of facts. See generally Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the
Flawed Ontology of Copyright Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 43 (2007) (discussing problems with
correspondence theory). There are severe problems with the correspondence theory of facts,
according to which there are things called “facts” in the world that preexist the people who report
them. See id. at 51-52. Even two chemists looking at the same burette may report different
readings, and even a statement about the temperature involves a slew of social commitments
about what a “temperature” is and how to measure it. See id. at 88-92. A weaker form of the fact
theory of ratings would say only that ratings are “facts” in the same sense as temperatures or
other things that copyright law indisputably treats as facts, notwithstanding the objections to
the correspondence theory. See generally id.
126.
See, e.g., id. at 70 (discussing how people “use numeric valuations as facts”).

870

VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 14:4:851

B. Aspects of Ratings
The three theories of ratings are all correct—and all three are
wrong. If one is sometimes better than the others at explaining
particular ratings, it is not because the world of ratings comes neatly
divided into ratings that are facts, opinions, or self-fulfilling
prophecies, but rather because every rating partakes of all three in
varying measure.
To understand ratings, it is necessary to
understand which aspects of a given rating are better explained by
one theory or another, rather than using the theories to make a
ternary classification of the rating as a “fact” or “opinion” or
“self-fulfilling prophecy.” This section will anatomize ratings to show
the interplay of the three theories.
Fact theory correctly explains ratings’ extensive reliance on
factual data. This is particularly obvious with the credit report books,
which depended on mountains of reports from correspondents about
particular businesses. Price guides are similarly dependent on
extensive information about past transactions. RBC Nice Bearings
provides an extreme example of a rating whose factual inputs are
utterly central to the rating.127 But even ratings with an obviously
dominant subjective component, such as Publishers Weekly’s choices of
which reviews to star, depend on empirical observation: a book review
by someone who hasn’t read the book isn’t meaningfully a “review.”
On the other hand, opinion theory emphasizes that some
ratings are based on irreducibly subjective aesthetic and value
judgments. It may be a near-universal belief that food should not
taste of rotting garbage, but beyond that, any judgment of quality
necessarily contains claims about which reasonable eaters can
disagree. That said, it is a fact what a particular rater’s subjective
reaction to something is—this author would be lying if he said he liked
the J.J. Abrams Star Trek reboot. The subjective-quality aspect of
ratings, of course, includes not just judgments about what is best for
the rater, but also about what is best. Movieguide scores movies from
−4 (abhorrent) to +4 (exemplary) based on their conformity to a
“traditional view of the Bible and Christianity.”128 These are value
judgments other traditional Christians are expected to share, not
purely individual reactions.
When it comes to a rating’s outputs, the fact theory correctly
emphasizes ratings’ predictive purpose.
Personal credit ratings
127.
See supra Part I.B. See generally RBC Nice Bearings, Inc. v. Peer Bearing Co., 676
F. Supp. 2d 9 (D. Conn. 2009) (discussing load ratings for ball bearings).
128.
What the Ratings Mean, MOVIEGUIDE (Oct. 30, 2008), http://www.movieguide.org/c/
info/subscriber-services.html.
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attempt to predict whether a person will repay her debts. Either she
will or she won’t, and when she does or does or doesn’t, that will be a
fact. The market-improvement purpose of ratings is incomprehensible
without this correspondence with observed reality. Indeed, even
highly subjective questions can still be objective from the perspective
of someone trying to give useful advice. Taste in food is necessarily
subjective, but readers still find a Zagat guide helpful in predicting
which restaurants they will like. The Netflix Prize, in which
contestants tried to predict most accurately the subjective ratings
Netflix users would give movies, had a completely objective win
condition: closest statistical correspondence to Netflix users’ ratings.129
In contrast, the opinion theory points out that beliefs about
facts are just that: beliefs.130 In particular, the future is always
unknowable until it happens: no matter how many tests a batch of
ball bearings has undergone, the only way to know how much weight a
given bearing will support is to load it until it fails. Until then, there
are no facts, only opinions about what will happen.
“Opinion” can therefore have two very different meanings. One
is a subjective reaction to an inherently subjective matter—what are
the ten most awesome sports cars of all time? The other is a
subjective guess at how best to predict what will be objectively true in
the future—what is the probability that this structured debt
instrument will repay its investors?
Both are subjective, but
differently so—the former conceals a value judgment, and the latter
does not.131 Subjective reactions are differences of values that law
must take as given; the opinion theory values this diversity for its own
sake. In contrast, the opinion theory values subjective guesses as a
form of instrumental diversity: having more than one belief about the
world tends to make it more likely that someone will be right.
Next, consider what the theories say about the rating process.
The choice of process—including both the computational algorithms
and the human information flow involved—expresses an opinion about
the best overall way to make a set of predictions. That is, it’s not an
opinion about a specific rating, but rather a meta-opinion about a
general class of ratings. Of course, in the process of applying the
129.
See The Netflix Prize Rules, NETFLIX PRIZE, http://www.netflixprize.com/rules (last
visited Mar. 2, 2012).
130.
See Alan L. Durham, Speaking of the World: Fact, Opinion and the Originality
Standard of Copyright, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 791, 831 (2001).
131.
Cf. PATRY, supra note 13, § 4:50 (describing Kapes and Maclean Hunter as mistaken
applications of the “fact/value distinction”). In Patry’s view, price estimates are inherently
factual statements, not “moral or ethical statements of belief.” Id.; cf. Dan L. Burk, Method and
Madness in Copyright Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 587, 607 (distinguishing “objective message about
the physical world” from “subjective message about the experience of being human”).
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system to produce a given rating, it may be necessary to make further
judgment calls or subjective statements of quality, and these will
introduce specific opinion to the mix.132
But within this opinion-driven framework, there is a further
aspect of a ratings process that is strongly factual. Just as it is a fact
whether a subjective individual rater holds a particular opinion of the
subject, it is also a fact that a rater applied a given process to produce
a given rating. If the Zagat guide gives Pepolino an 11 in retaliation
for Nina Zagat’s run-in with an off-duty waiter, readers would feel
comfortable calling the 11 a lie, because Zagat holds out to the world
that its published numerical ratings are actually the ones derived by
applying its “special formula”133 to the reviews it receives. The
formula may be confidential, opinionated, and based on opinionated
data, but its actual application is a factual matter.134
So far, the discussion has involved only the fact and opinion
theories, not the prophetic theory, because the prophetic theory comes
later in time. Fact and opinion speak to the production of the rating,
but self-fulfilling prophecy speaks to its reception: how people act on it
and react to it. Like the fact theory, it posits a correlation between
rating and reality, but here the question is whether reality
corresponds with the rating by the time its predictions have come due.
There are four effects worth considering.
First, the purpose of a rating is to enable its users to cut off
their own investigations early—to leave aside some information and
rely instead on the rating. It must be understood that this is the point
of a rating. Its value to users consists in its information-cost savings,
which is just another way of saying that rating users deliberately
choose to remain ignorant of some potentially relevant information.
Second, ratings themselves are inherently reductive. They
compress the complexity of the universe into a single value. The
rating’s creator must choose what to ignore. It must choose what not
to investigate, and what to investigate but then disregard. It must
choose how to measure complex phenomena, how to weigh conflicting
132.
In some cases, fact theory’s emphasis on accurate predictions will emphasize that
some opinions about a good choice of process are reasonably plausible, and others are not. This
author would not want to measure ball bearing load ratings by chewing them. But this is not to
say that Steve Steeljaw, who performs chew tests, does not hold the opinion that it is a good
testing methodology—only that Steve’s opinion is self-evidently silly.
133.
What do Zagat Ratings Mean?, ZAGAT, http://support.google.com/zagat/bin/answer.
py?hl=en&answer=1705271 (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
134.
When the process itself incorporates individual discretionary and subjective
elements, there may be particularly difficult boundary cases. Cf. James Grimmelmann, Some
Skepticism About Search Neutrality, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE 435, 456-58 (Berin Szoka &
Adam Marcus eds., 2010) (questioning distinction between manual “manipulation” of search
results and changing the search algorithm itself).
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values, and how to predict an inherently unknowable future. This,
again, is the value of the rating: it uses human expertise to turn a
messy reality into usable information. But it also necessarily means
that ratings diverge from the underlying world.135
The only
completely accurate rating system is the world itself; all human
ratings are approximations, some better, some worse.
Third, ratings serve as focal points for coordination by their
users. If Delia drives her junker of a Corolla onto the lot of a used-car
dealer, the negotiations over the price are likely to start at the value
pulled from the Red Book or one of its competitors. This, again, is part
of the point. The car-price guides help make a market possible by
distributing price information. And tendency of users to rely on the
ratings can give rated entities an incentive to clean up their act.136
But it also means that the coordination function will guarantee the
rating’s use even if it’s inaccurate, indeed, even if it’s known to be
inaccurate.137 The rating is the street lamp in a drunken key-hunt.
Fourth, law sometimes requires the use of ratings. When it
does, the rating is deemed true as a matter of law. If insurance
companies are required to pay at the value given by a car-price
website, then any price posted on the website immediately becomes a
market price. The Securities and Exchange Commission and state
regulators require some investors to buy only highly rated securities;
giving a bond an “investment grade” rating makes it into a “safe”
investment by regulatory fiat.138
Thus, the three theories interweave to describe a rating:
1. External data about the subject are facts.
2. Tastes and values are opinions, but it is a fact whether the
rater actually holds them.
135.
See Malcolm Gladwell, The Order of Things: What College Rankings Really Tell Us,
NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2011, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/02/14/110214fa_fact_
gladwell (discussing the arbitrary nature of choices made in college and other rankings).
136.
Sometimes metaphorically (think of the Zagat Survey) and sometimes literally
(think of New York’s letter grades for restaurant hygiene). See generally N.Y. DEP’T HEALTH &
MENTAL HYGIENE, RESTAURANT GRADING IN NEW YORK CITY AT 18 MONTHS 3 (2012), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/rii/restaurant-grading-18-month-report.pdf (finding
that “many key violations were less prevalent at 18 months [after requiring restaurants to post
their inspection grades] than in the year prior to grading”).
137.
See, e.g., Diane Ravitch, No Student Left Untested, NYR BLOG (Feb. 21, 2012),
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/feb/21/no-student-left-untested (criticizing use of
test-score-based teacher ratings in decisions to fire effective teachers with “ineffective” ratings);;
Gary Rubinstein, Analyzing Released NYC Value-Added Data Part 2, TEACH FOR US (Feb. 28,
2012), http://garyrubinstein.teachforus.org/2012/02/28/analyzing-released-nyc-value-added-datapart-2 (demonstrating that New York City teacher ratings fail basic tests of reproducibility).
138.
See generally Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of the Financial Markets?: Two
Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 619 (1999) (listing examples of
state and federal incorporation of credit ratings into law).
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3. It is a fact whether a rating’s testable predictions are
ultimately correct, but an opinion as to what will happen before
it actually does.
4. Contestable choices made in designing and applying a
process are opinions, but what process the rater actually
followed is a fact.
5. Ratings can be self-fulfilling prophecies because users do
not check their accuracy, because the rater itself throws
information away, because ratings serve as focal points for
coordination, or because the law deems them to be correct.
III. COPYRIGHT IN RATINGS RECONSIDERED
This Part asks what the theories of ratings detailed in Part II
have to say about copyright. It reexamines the doctrinal bona fides of
some of the cases discussed in Part I, and in the process, sketches
what the three theories of ratings have to say about the conventional
utilitarian story of copyright as a tradeoff between authorial
incentives and public access.139
A. External Data
In incentive-theoretic terms, there are two justifications
usually given for the rule that facts are uncopyrightable. The first,
and less persuasive, is that there is no particular need for an incentive
to discover facts, since they already exist. But the early credit-rating
cases amply illustrate just how much work goes into researching
ratings. Here is how the district court described the defendant’s
credit-rating book in Lumbermen’s Credit:
There are in respondents’ reference book more than 60,000 names. The evidence shows
that there are on hand more than 1,000,000 reports, replies to inquiries, etc. It further
appears that defendants receive large numbers of newspapers, magazines, trade
journals and bulletins; that they use traveling men, lumber dealers, agents, lawyers,
justices of the peace, mercantile associations, railroad companies and the clippings sent
out by a number of clipping bureaus. At times defendants’ mail reaches approximately
2,000 pieces of mail per day. A large force of employees and large offices are required in
the management of the business.140

Such extensive effort is typical. The plaintiff in Produce Reporter Co.
spent at least half a million dollars a year—in 1924 dollars—to
compile its information about produce dealers.141
That is

139.
See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(noting the “difficult balance” between incentives and access).
140.
Dun v. Lumbermen’s Credit Ass’n, 209 U.S. 20, 21-22 (1908).
141.
Produce Reporter Co. v. Fruit Produce Rating Co., 1 F.2d 58, 58 (N.D. Ill. 1924).
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antihistamine money: not to be sneezed at. Companies in the business
of rating would not go to such effort and expense unnecessarily; even
gathering facts can be hard and expensive work.
Instead, the more convincing argument against copyright in
ratings-as-facts comes from the access side of the ledger. There are
compelling public policy reasons for a robust public domain in facts: it
promotes democratic political debate, ensures a common foundation
for scientific inquiry, and assists in making public participation in
society more egalitarian. In a liberal society, everyone is entitled to
their own opinions, but no one is entitled to own the facts. This
enhanced need for access to “building block” facts overrides the
argument for incentives to gather them, neatly disposing of any claim
to copyright in the masses of raw data on which ratings depend.
That said, some courts may be too quick to assume that ratings
simply report on observations made about the world. Legg Mason may
be one such case.142 It is not obvious where one would go to observe
“short-term-buying-power”143 in the wild, but the parties treated it as
a fact, and the court didn’t bat an eye.144 At the very least, it seems
like an interpretation of facts, rather than a fact as such—but if so,
then unoriginality is no longer a convincing explanation of why it is
uncopyrightable.145
B. Tastes and Values
What about the subjective tastes and values that also go into a
rating? If ratings are the “personal reaction of an individual upon
nature,”146 then copying even a small sample of them is still copying
something genuinely original. The rater’s process looks like a
novelist’s: she observes the world, then produces something
indisputably “one [wo]man’s alone.”147
Here, the access argument against copyright falls away. Since
these subjective beliefs, by definition, cannot preexist the rater, there
is no risk that granting copyright will withdraw them from the public
domain. The public never has less of the rater’s subjectivity after the
rating than it had before.

142.
See Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc. 271 F. Supp. 2d 737 (D. Md. 2003).
143.
Id. at 742.
144.
Id. at 754.
145.
Cf. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding interpretations uncopyrightable because others need “broad latitude” to “make use of
historical subject matter,” rather than because interpretations are facts).
146.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
147.
Id.
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This reasoning drives Maclean Hunter, which distinguished
between hard ideas “that undertake to advance the understanding of
phenomena or the solution of problems” and soft ideas that are
“infused with the author’s taste or opinion.”148 The former are so
closely bound up with the world as to provide a serious risk that
copyright would inhibit scientific progress. Kregos v. Associated Press,
on which Maclean Hunter draws, gave the example of a doctor’s list of
symptoms for a diagnosis.149 If that list is meant as “a useful
identifier of the disease,” then merger will kick in to deny a copyright
that could otherwise prevent other doctors from writing about the
disease and its treatment.150 Maclean Hunter, by consigning ratings
to the second, softer category of ideas, purports to avoid this risk.151
As long as they really are subjective, ratings “do not materially assist
the understanding of future thinkers,” and thus the need for access is
no more pressing than it would be in a run-of-the-mill copyright
case.152
But this reasoning creates a puzzle on the incentive side. If
ratings are just “subjectively based,” what good do they do society that
justifies a grant of copyright?153 If Delia doesn’t like the trade-in value
a used car dealer quotes her from the Red Book, it doesn’t seem like a
satisfying comeback to say, “Well, that’s just Maclean Hunter’s
opinion.”154 Nor is the Red Book a particularly entertaining read—the
number of people who enjoy it on an aesthetic level is probably quite
small. The ratings in the Red Book are and are intended to be useful;
no one would buy it if they weren’t.
Maclean Hunter and the cases that depend on it have conflated
the two basic kinds of opinions. They have mistaken opinions
intended to be useful—such the best way to predict car prices—for
opinions “infused with the author’s taste.”155 That Maclean Hunter
did so while claiming to distinguish precisely these two kinds of
opinions is especially discouraging: it’s a fine test indeed whose own
proponents cannot apply it correctly.
148.
CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir.
1994).
149.
Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 707 (2d Cir. 1991).
150.
Id.
151.
Maclean Hunter, 44 F.3d at 72-73.
152.
Id. at 71.
153.
Id. at 71 n.21 (quoting Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 863 (2d Cir.
1984)).
154.
See Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright and Creativity, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 169, 192
n.95 (2008) (“The social goal is not to have a variety of esthetically pleasing guesses about these
numbers but rather to have as close an approximation as possible to the actual value . . . .”).
155.
See, e.g., Durham, supra note 130, at 840 (questioning theory used in Kregos and
adopted by Maclean Hunter).
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C. Predictions
Predictions about future events are both facts and opinions as
they attempt to describe accurately what will happen, but they
express contestable opinions until it does happen. Copyright doctrine
would suggest that ratings are copyrightable not as descriptions, but
only
as
expressions
of
opinion.156
This
pair
of
uncontroversial-sounding propositions creates serious trouble at the
borderline between the two categories. The better a rating—because
it is more accurately predictive—the less copyright will be willing to
protect it.157
Assume that Netflix could predict with complete accuracy how
much its users will like any movie. These ratings would be purely
factual and hence uncopyrightable.
But suppose that Netflix’s
algorithm were measurably worse—for example, because Netflix
employees were occasionally instructed to let off steam by adjusting
ratings up and down based on random whimsy. These sabotaged
ratings would be less accurate and less useful, but more copyrightable.
They would be “infused with the author’s taste or opinion,” and hence
immune from merger.
Ratings-as-opinions showers its favors on ratings that are
measurably worse: it encourages raters to exaggerate the difficulty of
the rating task and to eschew simple techniques. That’s an incentive
all right: a bad one. The problem here is that copyright is not well
engineered to encourage the creation of objectively useful works, as
opposed to subjectively expressive ones.158
The complicated
abstraction-filtration-comparison test for computer software159 and the
tortured compilation reasoning that courts use in map cases show how
much doctrinal violence it takes to bend copyright to a useful
purpose.160
There is nothing special regarding ratings in this
respect—copyright is simply not a good tool for the job.

156.
See supra Part I.B-C.
157.
See Burk, supra note 131, at 594 (criticizing Maclean Hunter because “the
supposedly ‘original’ aspects of the values . . . were the kind of ‘choices’ dictated by the desire for
accuracy”);; id. at 595 (noting that “in the Second Circuit . . . they have decided that some facts
aren’t factual”).
158.
See, e.g., Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1149, 1150 (1998) (discussing functional computer programs as a problematic case for copyright).
159.
See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 704 (2d Cir. 1992).
160.
See, e.g., Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 141 n.10 (5th Cir. 1992)
(finding originality in mapmaker’s “judgment” about where survey lines were located).
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D. Processes
Courts have attempted to evade this theoretical and doctrinal
problem by embracing the process theory.161 Treating ratings as the
outputs of creative processes seems to offer a satisfying way of
harmonizing ratings’ value with copyright. It perceptively focuses on
the hard and contested part of ratings—creating and applying a rating
process—and attempts to describe it in a way that matches what
copyright is looking for. Unfortunately, the resulting test is both
doctrinally and theoretically unsound.
A rating process by itself is uncopyrightable, and the Copyright
Act could not be more explicit on the point: “[i]n no case does copyright
protection . . . extend to any . . . procedure, process, system, [or]
method of operation.”162 One could respond to this objection by
arguing that courts are protecting an original work produced using the
process, not the process itself. But applying an original and creative
process does not guarantee that what emerges will be original and
creative.163 A photographer who takes a picture of Mount Fuji with
the lens cap on has not succeeded in creating a copyrightable work.
There is no “distinguishable variation” between her all-black print and
any other all-black image of the same dimensions.164 She may have
made countless creative choices, conscious and unconscious, in
composing and taking the shot. But the resulting “work” does not
reflect any of those choices; it bears no authorship whatsoever. So too
with “☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ”: by itself it is unoriginal.165 Creativity only counts
for copyrightability purposes if it translates into perceptible original
expression in the resulting work.166
In theoretical terms, the problem with the creative-process
theory is not perversity but supreme indifference. If any rating
161.
See supra Part I.C. The argument that one could claim a copyright in the fact (read:
uncreative labor) of having followed a given process is such an obvious nonstarter after Feist that
it is never made.
162.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
163.
Cf. PATRY, supra note 13, § 4:50 (arguing that Kapes and Maclean Hunter “confus[e]
judgment with originality”). There is an analogy here to computer-generated works. If ratings
were copyrightable solely because they came from an original process, then .doc files would be
copyrightable solely because they were produced by Microsoft Word, regardless of what the files
actually contained. Cf. Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated
Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185 (1986) (arguing that authorship in such works is contributed by
the user, not the programmer).
164.
Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927); see
also L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1976) (requiring “genuine
difference” to make a work copyrightable).
165.
See Hughes, supra note 18, at 630.
166.
See also, Burk, supra note 131, at 598 (“Protecting the end product . . . effectively
protects the method by which that end-product was generated . . . .”).

2012]

THREE THEORIES OF COPYRIGHT IN RATINGS

879

resulting from a minimally creative process is copyrightable, then
copyright encourages raters to come up with their own minimally
creative processes—regardless of whether the creativity in those
processes has any detectable influence on the ratings themselves.
Perhaps the plaintiff in RBC Nice Bearings should have had its
engineers write a haiku on each test report, then carefully erase it
before proceeding to enter the numbers in the spreadsheet of bearing
load data. By the reasoning of Health Grades, that would have made
for a sufficiently “creative and original” process to make the resulting
ratings copyrightable.167 It would not, however, have done society any
good.
E. Reception
The cases that treat ratings as self-fulfilling prophecies are
cases about power. They share the sense that the copyright owner is
somehow in a position to dictate to others that they must use its
rating.168 Such ratings are examples of what Justin Hughes calls
“social facts”: instances in which “original expression becomes the
basis for universally accepted propositions of the form, ‘this is X,’ ‘that
is Y,’ ‘A is B’ that seem to have truth values.”169 The rater can afford
to be indifferent to the ratings’ accuracy (thereby showing that the
ratings are not discovered facts), and users are indifferent to the
ratings’ expressive value (thereby showing that the ratings are not
creative opinions). The plaintiff tends to win when the court thinks
that people have a meaningful alternative to using its ratings, and to
lose when the court thinks that people must pay more attention to the
ratings than to their purported subjects. That is, the rating’s
copyrightability turns on whether it is “universally accepted,” to use
Hughes’s phrase.
This tendency is most obvious in NYMEX, where the plaintiff
exchange required traders to use its prices when providing margin
capital.170 But in any price case, the rating’s coordination function
167.
Health Grades, Inc. v. Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d
1226, 1235 (D. Colo. 2009). Health Grades held that star ratings had “the minimal degree of
creativity necessary to warrant copyright protection” because they were “the product of Health
Grades’ rating and award system.” Id. at 1237-38.
168.
This idea finds support in the cases on standards and interoperability. See, e.g.,
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 820-22 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J.,
concurring) (arguing that a hierarchy of commands in a computer program is uncopyrightable
because customers should not be “captives” of the first company to use it);; Computer Assocs. Int’l
v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 709-10 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that portions of a computer program
dictated by “external factors,” such as compatibility with other programs, are uncopyrightable)
169.
Hughes, supra note 125, at 90.
170.
NYMEX, Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 109, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2007).
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will be important: the market-maker’s job is to create prices at which
trades will happen, which means it succeeds precisely when traders
adopt the values it suggests. Is the Card Price Guide “the authority”
because it is widely followed, or is it widely followed because it is “the
authority”? Theflyonthewall.com refers to the “bare fact” of the
brokers’ recommendations;171 it might equally well have referred to
the “brute force” that the brokers and their clients can exert on the
market.
This is the source of CCC’s argument in Maclean Hunter: that
state laws require the use of the Red Book’s values.172 One need not
embrace the idea that the Red Book has become a kind of privately
drafted legislation to believe that it might owe its success to factors
other than its quality. States have given the Red Book a franchise to
be an arbiter of record for used car valuations. Indeed, on a
day-to-day level, the Red Book is now no longer particularly
accountable to its clients. It doesn’t matter whether the prices are
“accurate,” not when the law requires them. Indeed, if the law sets
insurance payments at Red Book levels, the Red Book prices will have
a hydraulic effect on the rest of the used-car market, which will show
a greater tendency to converge on Red Book prices.
Theflyonthewall.com’s holding is couched in access terms.
Treating Fly as a media defendant reporting the news only makes
sense if it is reporting news worth reporting. Thus, this framing
accepts that there is a special public interest in knowing that analysts
have made recommendations. It’s hard to say that the public has a
compelling interest in unfettered access to the full details of
hundred-page analyst reports—but it sounds more plausible that
there is such an interest in access to the top-line rating that each
report contains.
But Theflyonthewall.com also depends on a point about
incentives. In the court’s view, the brokers are publicly touting a
stock just after telling their clients to stock up on it.173 At that point,
purely because of the Wall Street herd mentality, the brokers’ ratings
become reality in the short run, and the brokers’ clients make a quick
profit, whether or not the rating was justified in the slightest. The
court is hesitant to use its power to help the brokers enforce the lead
time they give their clients; that is, it is hesitant to make the brokers
the beneficiaries of intellectual property’s incentives. If this is an

171.
Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876, 896 n.29 (2d Cir.
2011).
172.
See CCC Info. Servs. Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 64 (2d
Cir. 1994); supra text accompanying notes 88-91.
173.
Theflyonthewall.com, 650 F.3d at 896 n.29.
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immoral and inefficient business model, as the court seems to be
thinking,174 the point undercuts the incentives argument for copyright,
not just the access argument against it.175
Theflyonthewall.com, then, has tapped into our deep societal
anxiety about ratings, an anxiety that is the uncanny reflection of our
deep societal attraction to ratings. The Zagat guides were once the
“sine qua non of restaurant guidebooks” and “all that mattered to
restaurateurs.”176 Google can “destroy businesses with a single
algorithmic change” by lowering their search rankings.177 Bad ratings
can close a restaurant, end a consumer’s chance for a mortgage, kill a
movie on opening weekend, or send a country into an economic crisis.
The power to rate is the power to destroy.
It’s not so clear, however, that pulling the only lever the court
has to pull—withholding intellectual property protection—will
improve matters. Fly’s service was available through subscription on
its website, on Bloomberg terminals, and through various other
licensing agreements.178 In other words, it, too, is profiting from
unequal access to the recommendations.179 If one accepts footnote
twenty-nine’s dog-eat-dog view of the financial world,180 then Fly’s
subscribers aren’t just chumps at the mercy of the brokerages—they’re
on the prowl looking for some chumps of their own.
All of which is to say that the Theflyonthewall.com court’s
skepticism is far more corrosive to copyright theory than it realizes.
The court cogently explains why the self-fulfilling prophecy theory of
ratings potentially undercuts the argument for using intellectual
property incentives to encourage their creation.181 But, for exactly the
same reason, the peculiar nature of ratings also potentially undercuts
the argument for promoting public access to them. If their creation is
bad for society, then so too is their dissemination. Both halves of the
standard copyright story fall apart, not just one. The idea of ratings
as self-fulfilling prophecies doesn’t resolve the tension between
treating them as facts and treating them as opinions; it destabilizes
the entire theoretical framework within which that tension exists.

174.
See id. (arguing that the Firms’ clients “would literally be profiting at the expense
of” traders from whom knowledge of the recommendations has been withheld).
175.
See Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property’s
Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 923 (2010).
176.
Nina Zagat, GAWKER (Feb. 3, 2008), http://gawker.com/550458/nina-zagat.
177.
How Google is Destroying Small Business & Jobs, SAVINGSMALLBUSINESS.ORG,
http://www.savingsmallbusiness.org (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
178.
Theflyonthewall.com, 650 F.3d at 883.
179.
See id.
180.
See id. at 896 n.29; supra text accompanying notes 112-114.
181.
See supra Part I.D (discussing Theflyonthewall.com).
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IV. A WORD FROM THE SCHOLARS
Although no one has written at length about copyright in
ratings as such, three scholars have given the price-guide cases close
attention in ways that are relevant to this Article’s taxonomy: Alan L.
Durham,182 Michael Steven Green,183 and Justin Hughes.184 They
recognize that these valuations are a particularly problematic
category of “facts” because the valuations seem, at least in part, to be
created by the rater rather than discovered in the world. These
scholars are right that something strange is going on here in
copyright’s ontology, and the theories of ratings show why. Like other
ratings, valuations straddle the categories of facts, opinions, and
self-fulfilling prophecies—and scholars’ explanations for how copyright
law should treat them depend on how they resolve the valuations into
one category or another.
Alan L. Durham argues that all facts are “infused with opinion”
because even a population statistic will vary based on the census
taker’s methodology.185 In effect, this is a critique of the process
theory; he demonstrates that even a highly creative process can still
yield things that are indisputably “facts” for copyright purposes.186 In
his view, copyright is justifiably unwilling to protect these facts, not
because they are free of highly subjective beliefs, but because it would
give a “monopoly on its insights” about the world, which is not
copyright’s job.187 He finishes by recognizing Maclean Hunter’s
distinction between expressive and descriptive opinions,188 endorsing
it as the line between the copyrightable and the uncopyrightable.189

182.
Durham, supra note 130, at 825-31; Alan L. Durham, Speaking of the World: Fact,
Opinion and the Originality Standard of Copyright, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION OF
FACT-BASED WORKS 133, 161-72 (Robert F. Brauneis ed., 2009).
183.
Michael Steven Green, Copyrighting Facts, 78 IND. L.J. 919, 962-63 (2003)
[hereinafter Green, Copyrighting Facts]; Michael Steven Green, Two Fallacies About
Copyrighting Factual Compilations, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION OF FACT-BASED
WORKS, supra note 182, at 109, 119 [hereinafter Green, Two Fallacies].
184.
Hughes, supra note 125, at 68-77; Justin Hughes, Created Facts and Their Awkward
Place in Copyright Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION OF FACT-BASED WORKS, supra
note 182, at 186, 203-09; see also Burk, supra note 131, at 593-97; Karjala, supra note 154; David
McGowan, Copyright and Convergence: A Pragmatic Perspective, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION OF FACT-BASED WORKS, supra note 182, at 233, 258-62.
185.
Durham, supra note 130, at 838-39.
186.
See id. at 822-25 (discussing conjectures about history, such as why the Hindenburg
caught fire).
187.
Durham, supra note 182, at 172.
188.
Id. at 844-45 (contrasting a musicologist’s list of authentic J.S. Bach pieces with an
encyclopedist’s collection of interesting trivia).
189.
Id. at 844-47.
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Michael Steven Green’s view is the opposite of Durham’s; he
argues that Maclean Hunter’s valuations were facts because “[t]hey
were representations of the world that were to be taken as correct, not
fiction that could be appreciated independently of its truth.”190 This
approach focuses not on the production of the values, but on their
presentation. They were facts because they were held out as
descriptive claims about the world.191 He focuses on the usefulness of
predictive ratings, which, of course, is a characteristically fact-like
way of looking at them. But unlike Durham, Green approves of
copyright in price estimates, because “extensive judgment [is]
required.”192
Therefore, he implicitly embraces process theory.
Unlike the courts, however, Green thinks the creative process
produces an original “collective fact” rather than making any
individual rating original.193 On his view, any individual selection or
arrangement decision in a rating book or other factual compilation can
always be described as a “fact,” but the totality of those decisions
produces a work that as a whole displays originality.194
Interestingly, both Durham and Green flirt with the idea that
broad social acceptance may be central to some works’ value, as the
self-fulfilling prophecy theory of ratings suggests. Durham mentions
in passing the idea that price guides could be “self-fulfilling
prophecies” that “create the demand for certain cars or coins” and
appears to suggest that this might mean they were “create[d]” and to
that extent might justify a copyright.195 On the other hand, Green, in
a discussion of novel theories (his example is Einstein’s theory of
relativity), says their “value to any individual depends upon others
accepting it.”196 To him, this argues against a copyright, since
copyright could inhibit the very process of acceptance that gives these
theories their value.197
Justin Hughes is the scholar who has most fully explored the
idea that “evaluations” such as ratings “can become so widely accepted
190.
Green, Copyrighting Facts, supra note 183, at 962.
191.
See id. Green’s concept of “fact” is quite capacious: he argues, for example, that “it is
a fact that bean curd and bean sprout shops are of interest to the Chinese-American community.”
Green, Two Fallacies, supra note 183, at 120.
192.
Green, Two Fallacies, supra note 183, at 119. More specifically, Green sees the
rater’s judgment as being important in rebutting arguments that the same set of ratings could be
generated by two parties independently. Id. at 124. On this view, a process sufficiently original
to give distinguishably different results than other raters’ processes results in an original set of
ratings.
193.
Green, Copyrighting Facts, supra note 183, at 961-63.
194.
Green, Two Fallacies, supra note 183, at 115-18.
195.
Durham, supra note 130, at 842.
196.
Green, Copyrighting Facts, supra note 183, at 955-56.
197.
Id.
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and so relied upon for substantial nonexpressive [sic] activities that
they become social facts.”198 He argues that copyright treats these
created facts as uncopyrightable only when they become “widely
accepted by the relevant community”—or, in this Article’s
terminology, they have become self-fulfilling prophecies.199 But he
doesn’t like this analysis, because it might cut off the incentive to
create these works in the first place.200 Instead, he proposes a form of
merger analysis that would “dial back” copyright to a compulsory
license when an expressive-but-useful work has achieved such social
currency.201
These scholars’ analyses have two things in common. First,
they all recognize the validity of multiple theories but find one more
compelling than its rivals. Durham embraces the fact theory: he sees
the role that opinion plays in generating ratings, but thinks that
copyright can’t afford to recognize it, for what he openly admits are
policy considerations.202 Green prefers opinions: he would treat
collections of ratings as copyrightable because of their subjectivity,
even though they make fact-like claims about the world.203 And
Hughes endorses the prophetic theory: he sees the principal limit on
ratings copyright as coming from how “human-created facts function
in the social discourse.”204
Second, policy considerations bulk large for them all. In a
later-added postscript, Durham is explicit that the uncopyrightability
of “opinionated facts” rests on a policy judgment about the need for
public access.205 Green’s view that they are copyrightable rests on
their social value, qualified only by a concern about transaction
costs.206 Hughes’s proposal to modify the merger doctrine requires
courts to engage in an ex ante/ex post assessment of the effects of its
holding on raters’ business models, because he fears that in some
cases valuable creative facts might not be brought into existence
without copyright.207
198.
Hughes, supra note 125, at 68.
199.
Id. at 84.
200.
Id. at 93-94.
201.
Id. at 105-07.
202.
Durham, supra note 130, at 847-48. Unfortunately, he does not follow up on the
idea.
203.
Green, Copyrighting Facts, supra note 183, at 949-51, 961-63.
204.
Hughes, supra note 125, at 45.
205.
Durham, supra note 182, at 181-85.
206.
Green, Two Fallacies, supra note 183, at 127-32.
207.
Hughes, supra note 125, at 98-107. This Article adds to his analysis the observation,
inspired by Theflyonthewall.com, that these social facts can be social bads as well as social goods,
which upends the standard argument from incentives. Another scholar, David McGowan, would
avoid the classification question entirely by switching from originality to the purely economic
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The problem here is that policy cannot bear the weight these
scholars would put on it, or at least not yet. Theflyonthewall.com
shows why we cannot simply reason about raters’ incentives and
public access to ratings—we do not in general know whether ratings
are good or bad for society. That’s not a question that intellectual
property law is equipped to answer on its own. It depends on all of the
other legal problems with ratings: whether and when they are
fraudulent, or defamatory, or collusive, or objectionable in one of the
many other ways that ratings can be. In short, we need to know how
ratings can go wrong before we can decide whether to grant rights in
them.
V. ON BEYOND COPYRIGHT
Ratings matter to law, and law has two basic goals for them.
The first is to encourage their production; the second is to hold them
accountable. Providing proper incentives to create information is the
domain of intellectual property law; ensuring the quality of
information takes place at the tricky frontier where tort law meets the
First Amendment.208 These bodies of law are the spurs and the reins
of rating, respectively. Intellectual property asks whether copying
ratings is wrong; fraud and defamation ask whether ratings
themselves are wrong.209
And yet these bodies of law are almost never in conversation
with each other. The copyright cases show no inclination to learn
from the tort cases, or vice versa. In the 1980s, the Illinois Attorney
General sued Maclean Hunter, alleging that the Red Book’s values
were “inaccurate, unrealistically low, and misleading.”210 Following
the suit, the Red Book gained a disclaimer: “You, the subscriber, must
be the final judge of the actual value of a particular vehicle.”211 A
decade later, the Second Circuit pointed to this disclaimer in holding
that the Red Book’s values could be copyrighted.212 But it did not
logic of sweat-of-the brow “cost recovery” in providing copyright for price lists. McGowan, supra
note 184.
208.
I include substantial bodies of securities law under the heading of “tort law” here
because of their strong roots in the common law of fraud and misrepresentation.
209.
For more on how these legal judgments cannot avoid engaging with ethical ones, see
generally James Grimmelmann, The Ethical Visions of Copyright Law, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2005
(2009).
210.
People ex rel. Hartigan v. Maclean Hunter Publ’g Corp., 457 N.E.2d 480, 482 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983).
211.
Appellee CCC Info. Servs. Inc.’s Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for
Rehearing En Banc, CCC Info. Servs. Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F. 3d 61 (2d
Cir. 1994) (No. 93-7687), 1994 WL 16040469 at *8 n.6.
212.
Maclean Hunter, 44 F.3d at 72-73.
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mention the earlier Red Book case—or any of the many other tort
cases that consider when ratings are protected statements of opinion
and when they are not.
Having turned to copyright law to understand what ratings
are, we now have a better grasp on the different theories underlying
them. So if we need to understand the regulation of ratings in order to
formulate sensible copyright policy, we at least have better tools with
which to start in on that task. Just as the classification of ratings as
facts, opinions, and self-fulfilling prophecies helps make sense of the
tensions in how copyright law treats them, so too it can help make
sense of the tensions in how tort law treats them.
If ratings are statements of fact, then a knowingly incorrect
rating is a lie, and the rater can be held liable for it. If ratings are
statements of opinion, then there is no way to prove a rating false, and
hence no basis for liability.
And if ratings are self-fulfilling
prophecies, then “true or false?” is entirely the wrong question to ask.
Which of these three theories best seems to fit could determine the
outcome when a court asks whether Moody’s should be held liable for
giving a piece-of-junk mortgage-backed security a Aaa rating213 or for
giving a financially stable school district’s bonds a “negative
outlook,”214 whether Google has committed tortious interference with
contract by giving a website a poor search ranking,215 or whether a
lawyer-rating website can legally give its CEO a higher rating than
Justice Ginsburg.216 A full exploration will need to await another
time, but it should be apparent that the interplay among the three
theories may yield important insights about ratings regulation.
The law’s trouble with ratings illustrates James Boyle’s
observation that information economics has a dual character:
The internal tension in the analysis always leaves open the question whether a
particular issue is to be classed as a public goods problem, for which the remedy is
commodification, or a monopoly of information problem, for which the remedy is
unfettered competition.217

If this looks like the tension between fact and opinion in courts’
discussions of ratings, the resemblance is not a coincidence. Ratings
as opinions are commodities: it makes sense to incentivize their

213.
See Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155,
175-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
214.
See Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d
848, 852-56 (10th Cir. 1999).
215.
See Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568,
at *1-2 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
216.
See Browne v. Avvo, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1251-53 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
217.
JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS 40 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
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production through private ownership. Ratings as facts are market
makers: we want broad public access to them.218
According to Boyle, courts resolve the tension between
commodification and competition in particular cases by “relying
unconsciously on the notion of the romantic author.”219 That is exactly
how the creative-process theory functions—it lets courts isolate an
“author” whose process-design choices stamp the resulting ratings
with her personality. But this Article’s discussion of ratings as
self-fulfilling prophecies adds a third option to the choice between
drudge and genius: the author as evil genius. This dark twin of the
romantic author has a creative vision and is determined to impose it
on the world, regardless of (or perhaps because of) its horrific
consequences for others. This counternarrative helps explain some of
the ambiguity we feel about ratings, in copyright and beyond.
VI. CONCLUSION
If the line between fact and opinion can be hazy under the best
of circumstances, in ratings cases it is downright vexing. Courts and
scholars have struggled to describe ratings as one or the other, with
results that run the gamut from frustration to confusion. Cases like
Maclean Hunter reach plausible results for implausible reasons;
scholars are at loggerheads over whether and why these facts are
different from all other facts.
But the problem of ratings is a three-body problem, not a
two-body problem. The hidden gravitational pull, the one that gives
“fact” and “opinion” chaotic orbits about each other, comes from
ratings’ tendency to become self-fulfilling prophecies. It is a weaker
contribution than either of the others; ratings can come much closer to
being pure facts or pure opinions than they can to being pure
prophecies. Still, it is a tendency present in every rating, and it is
better to recognize its influence than to pile up the epicycles by trying
to patch up the concepts of “fact” and “opinion” until they fit.
Ratings are not facts, opinions, or self-fulfilling prophecies.
They are all three. At different times and in different contexts,
ratings can act like one or the other, but it is a mistake to see them
only in terms of one of these theories. All three are always at work in
a rating, and truly understanding the rating requires being alert to all
three. This is a complicated, messy, not always pleasant story. But so
are ratings.

218.
219.

See Muhlerin, supra note 53, for an illuminating engagement with this duality.
BOYLE, supra note 217, at 42.

